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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4255 
 ___________ 
 
 IN RE:  MICHAEL JOHN PISKANIN, JR., 
        Petitioner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (Related to E.D. PA. Civ. No. 10-cv-05259) 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
 
January 13, 2011 
 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: January 20, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Michael J. Piskanin submitted a complaint and a motion to proceed in forma 
pauperis (“IFP”) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  The District Court denied his motion to proceed IFP without prejudice 
because Piskanin had failed to file a certified copy of his prisoner account statement for 
the six-month period prior to the filing date.  The Court explained that the inmate 
monthly account statement Piskanin had submitted was not sufficient as it did not provide 
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information for the entire six-month period. 
 Piskanin then filed this petition for a writ of mandamus.  Piskanin seeks to have 
this Court issue a mandamus order to the District Court judge, directing him “to Recuse 
and abstain from involvement in or influencing any and all actions in the federal courts 
involving petitioner,” including the action docketed at E.D. Pa. 10-CV-05259.  The 
petition includes unsupported allegations that the judge has ties to organized crime, and 
alleges that the judge “has acted to „Block‟ the Courthouse door to petitioner in various 
cases,” by insisting on strict adherence to the District Court‟s requirements regarding an 
inmate account certification.  Piskanin also makes unsupported allegations of the judge‟s 
political bias against him. 
Mandamus is an “extraordinary remedy” that we award only when a petitioner 
demonstrates, among other things, a “clear and indisputable” right to relief.  In re: 
Pressman-Gutman Co., 459 F.3d 383, 398-99 (3d Cir. 2006).  Mandamus lies only when 
there is no other remedy available. Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 
490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989).  Piskanin has not shown that he has no other remedy available, 
as he has not filed a motion to recuse in the District Court.  See In re Kensington Int‟l 
Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2003). 
Even if we were to assume that Piskanin had no other adequate means to challenge 
the judge‟s involvement in his cases, he plainly has not shown that he has a clear and 
indisputable right to the writ, nor that we should exercise our discretion in his favor.  
Section 455(a) of title 28 provides that: “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the 
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United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”  28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  Section 455(b)(1) provides that a judge 
shall also disqualify himself where “he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding[.]”  
28 U.S.C. § 455.  Piskanin‟s unsupported allegations of bias do not require 
disqualification by the District Judge.  Thus, we are not required to issue a writ of 
mandamus directing him to recuse himself.  In re: School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 
764, 778 (3d Cir. 1992) (mandamus relief concerning judge‟s failure to recuse only 
warranted where statute “clearly and indisputably” required him to recuse); see also 
Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(party‟s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal).  To 
the extent Piskanin seeks to have the District Judge withdraw pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
144, he has not stated facts that would convince a reasonable person that bias exists, nor 
has he stated facts that show bias that is personal in nature, see United States v. 
Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 1973).
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. 
 
                                                 
1
 In any event, mandamus may not be used to correct a district judge‟s failure to 
disqualify himself pursuant to § 144.  See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 
F.2d 764, 775-76 (3d Cir. 1992). 
